Given that the same person, General Sissi, currently holds the ministries of defense and deputy premiership, it is clear that the leaders of the armed forces are in control of the transitional process. Thus, whether it is well prepared or not, the army now is in a no-win situation. On the one hand, reinstating Morsi to power risks a total loss of public faith in the military that had previously enjoyed a special place in the history of Egypt. On the other hand, the military would find it very difficult to maintain its course as stipulated in the roadmap without using force against the disenfranchised and extremist elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. The use of violence would draw the military into direct conflict with a large section of the population and inject it into the centre of the Egyptian political crisis. The pro-Morsi protest may metamorphosis into an underground resistance unless its main grievances are addressed. Their violent methods may not be limited to the military, but to all political forces that are seen to cooperate with the military. A situation that it abhors most, a direct conflict with large segments of the population, would negatively affect the stature and legitimacy of the military in the public eye.
Neither the military nor an interim civilian government could maintain power in Egypt by manipulation or intimidation. More importantly, the current crisis and the increasing violence reveals more than any thing else that governance by sheer force, and through the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood, is going to be a very risky undertaking for the stability of Egypt and the region at large.
The Pro Morsi and the Egyptian Army