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TANA FORUM 2019

Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa:
Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends

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PREFACE

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University (AAU), which serves as the Secretariat of Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, is pleased to present a collection of policy briefs to inform discussions at the 8th Tana Forum. This year's theme is "Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa: Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends". Over the course of 2018, emerging political and security dynamics have brought about a new wave of hope in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Improved diplomatic relations between and among the countries of the region, including between Eritrea and Ethiopia; Eritrea and Djibouti as well as Eritrea and Somalia have ignited a renewed momentum for peace with the prospect of spill-over effects occurring beyond the region. To effectively reap the peace dividends from the renewed rapprochement, it is imperative that countries of the Horn and other relevant stakeholders, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), understand the complexity of regional dynamics in order to devise a comprehensive strategy to build on progress and sustain the gains made thus far.

This collection of policy briefs seeks to contribute insights on the evolving political dynamics in the region, as well as provide policy recommendations to best nurture the emerging peace trends to sustainably resolve the political, economic and security challenges in the sub-region. It is my firm belief that this publication will contribute to knowledge generation on the theme and serve as a useful reference for researchers, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders in the region and beyond.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the authors who have contributed their time to write these briefs for their time and sharing their valuable insights. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to our partners and friends for enabling IPSS to continue to serve as the Secretariat of the Tana Forum and for making this year's Tana Forum a success once again. I am also very thankful to the IPSS editorial team for making possible the timely and successful publication of this collection.

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INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa has experienced remarkable developments in peace in 2018. The no-peace-no-war deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea was broken after the Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018 and approached the Eritrea's leader Isaias Afwerki in July 2018. Following the peace deal between the two former adversaries, Eritrea and Djibouti also agreed to resolve their border disputes through peaceful mechanisms. Furthermore, these peace deals led to a tripartite collaboration between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Analysts point out that the peace deals are not only inter-state collaborations but also contribute to intra-state stability in the individual countries.

The Horn of Africa is a conflict-ridden sub-region. This sub-region has been affected by colonial inherited border disputes that resulted in protracted wars for independence, including the Eritrean war (1961-1991) and the South Sudan war (1983-2011), and inter-state wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000). It is also one of the poorest sub-regions in the world due to climate change, environmental degradation, and economic mismanagement. Hostile inter-state relationships and an authoritarian rule in domestic politics have created a foreign policy relationship of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' among the states in the Horn. Some scholars hypothesize that these relationships operate through a concept called 'political market place', which gives emphasis to the greedy interests of leaders who want to sell their political power and political influence for money. This tendency has exposed the countries to transactional diplomacy, which uses money as an instrument of diplomacy to maintain the security and economic interests of external actors in the sub-region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has been vulnerable to intervention from regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

According to this year's policy brief contributors, the peace deals have created opportunities for dealing with these and other security threats. First, the peace deals have narrowed the communication gap between leaders and their communities over the last 20 years leading to a win-win situation in conflict resolution. Second, bilateral and tripartite state relationships greatly contribute to implementing international agreements and decisions with regard to border disputes and the normalization of relationships between states and communities. Moreover, the movement of people across borders, as well as cross-border trade, also contribute to the de-escalation of conflicts and to the sustaining of peace agreements.

Third, peace deals can also add to regional integration due to the opportunities created for integrated infrastructural development and subsequent corridor development along sea ports. Such developments can also help regional communities like IGAD to play its role by strengthening conflict management institutions, which in turn creates favourable conditions for the AU to maintain collaborative engagement in the sub-region.

Fourth, peace deals have also created opportunities for countries to deal with their democratic and governance deficiencies. Following the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal, many Ethiopian rebel groups harboured in Eritrea signed peace agreements with the Ethiopian government to pursue their political agendas through peaceful mechanisms.

The contributors noted some challenges to sustain the fruits of these peace deals. Though the peace deals are very promising, they have not been ratified by their respective parliaments or the institutions responsible for doing so. Detailed directives to encourage cross-border trade and the free movement of people across borders into normalization have been delayed. Agreements made at the level of state leaders, unless they are institutionalized and made transparent to the public on time, can also easily make vulnerable the national interests of the countries involved in transactional diplomacy.

The countries in the Horn also face a number of domestic problems that can undermine any positive developments. There are people who are displaced due to civil war and internal conflict; policies that result in forced migration of citizens; and governments that lack the capacity to maintain the rule of law.

Hence, to sustain the fruits of the peace deals, additional institutional efforts are required to engage national and regional institutions such as IGAD and AU. The countries of the Horn need to enhance the capacity of state institutions to maintain the rule of law on the one hand and to strengthen democratic institutions to organize democratic elections on the other. The Horn should also work towards a more integrated infrastructural development that contributes to corridor development and subsequently regional integration.

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EVOLVING PEACE TRENDS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR REVITALIZING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

Mehari Taddele Maru

Executive Summary

Strategically positioned at the major geopolitical and geo-economic nexus of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region belongs to the African and Middle Eastern economic, religious, historical, migratory, trade and security zones. It possesses a long coastline with deep natural ports and a busy maritime domain that links Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe.

The presence of four peacekeeping missions with more than 50,000 that comprise of the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops (Darfur-Sudan, Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan) (UN, 2019)[xxvxxvi] (Turse, 2019)[xxvii] and of hundreds of thousands of foreign military forces, accentuates the peace and security challenges of the IGAD region. Constituting one-seventh of the global displaced population, the number of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees stands at more than 10 million (UNHCR, 2018)[xxviii]. The IGAD is also a region of secessionist movements, of which some have been successful in achieving independence (South Sudan from Sudan, and Eritrea from Ethiopia), and others exercising de facto independence, such as Somaliland from Somalia.

In consequence of tectonic shifts triggered both by a strategic global competition of great powers and undercurrent upheavals in its immediate Middle East neighbourhood as well as changes in domestic political landscapes, IGAD is now a region in fast transition. This policy brief examines whether or not these ongoing changes in the region present opportunities for another round of revitalization of IGAD institutions, and if so, what areas of IGAD should be transformed. The policy brief deals with six key points concerning the requisite processes and concludes with a series of recommendations for a further phase of institutional revitalization. The key points are:

Background

IGAD Region Socioeconomic situation

The total land area of the IGAD member states covers 5.2 million km2 of territory, with a population of well over 226 million people. Agriculture remains the backbone of the regional economy, employing the overwhelming majority of the population, although contributing less than half of member states' total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IGAD, 2019a)[xxix]. Most member states of IGAD belong to the world's Least Developed Countries and half of their overall populations live below the poverty line. Nationals of IGAD member states earn United States Dollar (USD) 1,000 on average a year, less than Africans in the remaining sub-Saharan countries, where yearly earnings average about USD 1,624. The region as a whole (in particular Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan) is one of the world's highest recipients of international aid (IGAD, 2019a). A region of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, IGAD faces severe climatic changes and environmental degradation. Heavily dependent on

Key Points

Despite hopeful trajectories of political transformation, fast-growing economies and infrastructure-led integrative opportunities, three decades after the establishment of IGAD, the region remains far from achieving its vision of transformation into a peaceful, integrated, prosperous and democratic region.

Extreme poverty, rising population, extremely high levels of youth unemployment, lack of constitutional democratic governance constitute major challenges. Distrust among the member states of IGAD remains a source of instability and impediment for faster integration. Regional instability arising from pressures exerted by global and regional external powers contributes to the instability.

IGAD's notable past successes include peace and security initiatives and coordinating planning of infrastructural developments. If infrastructural growth is maintained, IGAD could soon become one of the leading, perhaps the leading, integrative Regional Economic Communities in Africa.

In order to maintain the new, optimistic trajectories of change in the region, transformation in IGAD, as an institution, and its Member States will be necessary. IGAD must focus on building the capabilities of the Member States to deliver and distribute public goods with a degree of inclusivity to bestow legitimacy; enhance security provisions and mobilise resources. Such a transformation would also require significant reform in IGAD itself through a change in its mandate and institutional setup.

agriculture and livestock, the region is prone to persistent extremes of drought and flooding. Thanks to protracted conflicts and unresponsive governance, its populations experience recurrent droughts and disasters that all too easily fester into grave food insecurity or even famine. In the arid borderlands, droughts are frequent and often devastating and can cause deaths and major population displacement and communal clashes over scarce pastures and water resources.

IGAD Institutions

IGAD was launched in November 1996. It replaced the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea and South Sudan achieved independence and subsequently joined IGAD as its seventh- and eighth-member states.

IGAD has four key organs. The Assembly is the supreme policy-making body and is composed of heads of state and government; the Council of Ministers which comprise of member states' ministers of foreign affairs and serves as a decision-making body; the Committee of Ambassadors serves as the members' permanent representative body and is made up of ambassadors of member states accredited to IGAD. The Secretariat is the fourth main entity: it consists of the executive secretary and directors of divisions and technical and support staff members and serves as the executive branch of IGAD. There are also committees working as technical bodies which are made up of ministers or senior officials responsible for specific sectors.

The Secretariat has four core functions. First, it serves as a powerhouse for IGAD and its various organs. It is the body responsible for conducting the day-to-day affairs of IGAD and more importantly, for providing expertise to the key organs and coordinates their activities (IGAD, 1966) (IGAD, 1996)[xxx]. Secondly, the Secretariat represents IGAD in all international and continental relations and in this capacity promotes and defends the organisation's interests (IGAD, 1996). Third, it facilitates the convening of the summit and other meetings of member states to discuss and decide on common agenda items; it is the single most continuous platform for setting normative processes (IGAD, 1996) (UNECA, 2016)[xxxi]. Fourth, the Secretariat disseminates mutually agreed-upon norms and decisions taken. It also supervises the implementation of IGAD decisions. More importantly, it prepares IGAD's strategic plan and budget in consultation with other organs of IGAD.

IGAD Achievements and Challenges

Achievements

IGAD is an infrastructure-focused Regional Economic Community (REC) (see Table 1 below). It has also achieved much in the area of peace and security by way of member states-led mediation efforts-- in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan.

Table 1: Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Integration Index Year 2016

REC	Trade integration	Regional infrastructure	Productive integration	Free movement of people	Financial and macroeconomic integration
CEN-SAD	0.353	0.251	0.247	0.479	0.524
COMESA	0.572	0.439	0.452	0.268	0.343
EAC	0.780	0.496	0.553	0.715	0.156
ECCAS	0.526	0.451	0.293	0.400	0.599
ECOWAS	0.442	0.426	0.265	0.800	0.611
IGAD	0.505	0.630	0.434	0.454	0.221
SADC	0.508	0.502	0.350	0.530	0.397
UMA	0.631	0.491	0.481	0.493	0.199
Average of eight RECs	0.540	0.461	0.384	0.517	0.381

IGAD and integrationist infrastructural development

Although rarely studied by researchers or covered by mainstream media, IGAD has facilitated regional infrastructural development and responses to drought and resilience, particularly in border areas. According to the UNECA 2016 Integration Report, IGAD heads all RECs by almost two points (although it lags in other areas) (UNECA, 2016). With the support of the African Development Bank (AfDB), it has coordinated design and implementation of an ambitious IGAD Regional Infrastructure Master Plan (IRIMP), including a regional hydroelectric power pool (ADB, 2018)[xxxii]. Airline connectivity in the region is among the most advanced on the African continent (UNECA, 2016).

Peace and security

IGAD has achieved much by way of member states-led mediation efforts in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan. The peace and security agenda is a central role for which IGAD has been long recognized by the international community. IGAD's key role in regional peace processes in Sudan and Somalia is well established, including and dates back to a bid by IGADD to end long-standing security problems by actively supporting regional peace processes, in particular in Sudan and Somalia. The actions included support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and IGAD-led mediation in South Sudan (IGAD, 2013)[xxxiii] (IGAD, 2019c)[xxxiv] (EU Commission, 2014)[xxxv]. Furthermore, IGAD played a vital role in the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM (IGAD, 2019d)[xxxvi].

Challenges

For many years the fundamental challenges facing IGAD revolved around extreme poverty; the predatory nature of states; undemocratic and corrupt political and social mobilisations; and unwarranted interference from regional and global strategic forces in the Middle East and beyond. In the past, long-standing animosity and mutual distrust between IGAD member states had inhibited progress at national and regional levels. Such distrust also opens up room for member states to succumb to pressure from external actors. The region also faces serious border and trans-boundary resource disputes between member states, which have led to diplomatic and, at times, military confrontation.

Nine 'megatrends', all of them transformative in nature, will determine the peace and development of the IGAD region. They are respectively: population growth and youth unemployment; public demand for economic de-livery and constitutional democracy with stiff electoral contestations; climate change and a surge in demand for water, food, and energy security; fast information and technological connectivity and infrastructural development; an increase in devolution and decentralization; rise in cross-border cooperation and mobility; surge in exploration and extraction of natural resources (oil, gas, gold, and minerals); trans-boundary natural resource disputes; and global geopolitical competition in the Red Sea strait and beyond.

De jure, if not de facto, the IGAD region has highly decentralized and devolved member states, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan, with constitutional systems that incorporate federal or devolutionary elements (IGAD, 2016)[xxxvii]. The trend in the region is towards competitive elections. Such a shift will certainly test and stress the professional neutrality, public accountability and institutional independence and strength of election management bodies and other entities such as the police, military and security forces. The IGAD Strategy 2020 document and its detailed sector strategies, therefore, dwell at length on these mega-trends. Since 2002, IGAD has tried to streamline its relations with member states' Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in general, but without much success (Maru, Ahmed, & Abdalla, 2017)[xxxviii]. Progressive provisions concerning CSOs written into national constitutions are undermined by restrictive legislation and regressive implementation.

Revitalizing IGAD

In the light of regional megatrends and recent ongoing changes, IGAD as an institution needs another round of revitalization. Crucially, it is governments' responsiveness that will dictate the pace of this process, and it is good governance that will determine regional peace and security, and the consequences associated with the mega-trends. National states and sub-national entities are the central actors in the transformation of the region, without which there will be no peace and security, governance, development or stability. But this proposition begs the question of precisely what pathways will lead to better-performing IGAD institutions?

The new dynamics, domestic, regional and global, offer opportunities and present challenges for the peace and security agenda in the region and IGAD. The recent surge in shuttle diplomacy and mediation in the IGAD region, though mainly stemming from domestic political changes and ongoing upheavals in member states, could offer new opportunities for cooperation in peace, security, and economic integration in the region. The opportunities extend also to cooperation to the maritime domain, partic-

ularly in the Red Sea with the Middle East. That said, the global shift of focus from 'war on terror' to 'the re-emergence of competition between great powers' –between the USA, China and Russia—could have for far-reaching consequences for the region and beyond. The ongoing rivalry between regional powers such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar, Turkey and Iran, on the other, could further complicate the peace and security situation. With a view towards forging a regional alliance, these global and regional competitions may put pressure that draws the member states of IGAD into these competitions and forces them to choose a side. The and crucial route is to avoiding reliance on any external power and maintaining neutrality.

To seize and sustain the emerging opportunities for peace and security, IGAD region needs to manage three critical developments prudently: the long-term strategic competition among the great powers; the interferences from regional powers from the Middle East; and political undercurrents at sub-national entities. The preoccupation of these global and regional forces with the IGAD region emanates from their deep-rooted national interest. They are also militarily, and financially heavyweights, and too big to take heed countries of the region and make any amends. To reduce interferences, and address the challenges posed in the tectonic shift in the Red Sea strait, the member states of the region need to act collectively by developing IGAD-wide institutionalized approach.

Such an approach needs to be guided by three terms: dynamic, due to a pace of change; pragmatic, as new networks and alliances are forged based on interests; and unified regional voice and collective action, as global forces in play are too big for a unilateral approach. The recent initiatives by the IGAD Council of Ministers and AU to forums for deliberations and action are the first steps in the right direction (IGAD, 2019f[xxxix]; Knopf, 2018[xl]; Vertin, 2019)[xli].

For IGAD to serve as an effective deliberative and decision-making body, it needs to undergo a further transformation, one that places political governance at the centre of its mandate. The revitalisation should focus on enabling member states to prioritise economic delivery and constitutional democracy. Furthermore, the upcoming elections in member states will be highly contested and thus IGAD needs to possess the mandate and capability to predict, prevent and appropriately respond to any challenges that may arise. IGAD needs an enhanced legal standing to work on democracy, elections, and governance by turning the implied mandate it currently enjoys into an explicit, fully-fledged one. In 2012, the Council of Ministers instructed the finalization of a draft Treaty that

aims to replace the 1996 IGAD Establishing Agreement and to establish new organizational structures for the implementation of the same Treaty once adopted (IGAD, 2012). For almost seven years, IGAD Secretariat has been waiting to present the draft Treaty and other similar instruments of reform to Ordinary Sessions of the policy organs.

Recently on 27 February 2019, IGAD Council of Ministers (CoM) held its 46th ordinary session that considered agenda items related to IGAD institutional setup (IGAD, 2019). In ordinary sessions of the policy organs, the rotation of Chairperson of IGAD will be considered after a decade of Ethiopian chairmanship, widely viewed as a key area of reform. It is to be recalled that earlier, on 21 June 2018, Ethiopia had announced that it would call an Ordinary IGAD Assembly in which it will hand over its chairmanship (IGAD, 2018a; Paanluel Media, 2018). On 16 November, IGAD decided to call for an Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers for December 2018 (IGAD, 2018b). In the same session, the Ministers decided to consider all matters of the IGAD organizational structure contained in a draft Treaty and Human Resource structure. To accomplish this, IGAD leaders should speed up the adoption, ratification, domestication and implementation of two instruments IGAD member states have long studied and validated: the draft Treaty and the draft Protocol on Governance (IGAD, 2009e)[xlii]. Implementation of these progressive, normative instruments could usher in a new period of a reinvigorated IGAD with a refreshed mantra for poverty eradication and constitutional democracy as the new frontiers of progress.

Conclusion

It is a widely held view that democracies do not go to war with one another; they never experience famines; they have more peaceful transitions; and they respect human rights more consistently than do other forms of government. The more effective the government, the more likely are guarantees of socio-economic development. The simplest way to the economic-security nexus is to broadly define security as 'human' security, which encompasses economic development, social justice and hard physical protection (Annan, 2000)[xliii]. In parallel with the regional transition, IGAD's institutions need to be reformed in order to ensure a smooth passage to the desired destination. Only interventions that support the transformation process can ensure that regional crises are gradually reduced and eventually eliminated. As regards to peace and security, transformation demands a build-up in IGAD's predictive, preventive, responsive and adaptive capabilities.

Recommendations

Overhaul the IGAD Secretariat

While member states are the component parts, the Secretariat is the engine on which IGAD depends, not only for its effective functioning but also for its ability to achieve the objectives set out in various documents, including the establishing agreement and (when ratified) the treaty. These functions can only be performed if major constraints that have hindered IGAD since its creation are removed.

- First and foremost, it would be necessary to remove the present, unduly limited mandate through radical internal reform of the Secretariat, bestowing a wider mandate through a revised draft Treaty.

- Second, IGAD needs more human and financial resources to discharge such a robust mandate and more of the resource needed by IGAD should come from the member states. IGAD needs to increase and also pay their assessed contribution on time, in addition to seeking alternative sources of funding.

- Third, IGAD should be mandated to recruit more competent staff based on merit and – to a limited degree – country representation.

- Fourth, and lastly, IGAD need to end norm-setting, and utilize resources for norm-implementation in collaboration with member states.

- IGAD must urgently revise the draft Treaty, so as to consider recent changes in the region, and introduce the necessary IGAD institutional reforms.

- By adopting and implementing the draft Protocol on Governance, IGAD must address the governance deficit, which is one of the main causes, accelerators and triggers of threats to regional peace and security.

- IGAD should empower democratic citizenry, addressing the ills arising from the current surge in sectarian identity politics, to build and maintain constitutional democracy through public institution-building.

- Most IGAD member states will have elections in 2020-2022 that are expected to become competitive and contested and may result in election-related violence. IGAD needs to assist member states more effectively to develop their capabilities to govern elections by investing in democratic institutions such as election bodies, the judiciary, police and the armed forces sufficient to deal with greater numbers of electoral contests.

- IGAD should build a responsive political and governance system to ensure stability. To address these issues member states need to introduce 'progressive decentralisation' that enhances integrative and human rights regimes and offers effectively accommodates a diversity of geographic, identity and religious and makes for the balanced development of centres and peripheries.

- Implementation of the principle of subsidiarity at the national level must be ensured, to give effect to the ultimate aim of governance, which is to enable local communities and authorities to govern and run their own public affairs. Such a process lays stress on the need for building local capacities, not only at a central state level but also at that of local communities.

- IGAD must act urgently and comprehensively on youth unemployment through education, pro-poor and labour-intensive investments designed to reduce social unrest and irregular migration, and facilitate youth employment.

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Mehari Taddele Maru holds a Doctorate of Legal Sciences (PhD) from JL Giessen University, Germany, an MPA from Harvard, USA, and an MSc from the University of Oxford, UK, as well as an LLB from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. He has more than 20 or so years of management and professional working experience in the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa

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